
Chapter One
My Thirteen Rules
President George H. W. Bush was sworn in to succeed President Ronald Reagan on January 20, 1989. The moment he took the oath I ceased to be the National Security Advisor; the torch was passed to my longtime colleague and mentor, General Brent Scowcroft.
After I left the White House, I returned to the Army. In April I was promoted to four-star general and given command of the Army’s Forces Command (FOR SCOM), with headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia, just outside Atlanta. I had command of all the deployable Army forces in the United States, including the Army Reserve, and I supervised the training of the Army National Guard. I was the first black Army officer to have a four-star troop command.
Shortly after I arrived at FOR SCOM, Parade magazine, the long-running Sunday supplement with a readership of more than fifty million people, asked to do a cover story about me and my new assignment—one of those short personal articles aimed at Americans reading their Sunday newspapers over coffee. Since the story was written and the supplement printed many weeks before its August 13 distribution date, Parade had no way of knowing that the 13th would be just three days after I was announced by President Bush to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The article was so timely that I was not able to persuade everyone that its publication date was a coincidence.
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Its author, David Wallechinsky, a highly skilled journalist, needed a hook to close the piece. One of my secretaries, Sergeant Cammie Brown, urged him to ask me about the couple of dozen snippets of paper shoved under the glass cover on my desktop—quotes and aphorisms that I had collected or made up over the years. David called and asked if I would read off a few. The thirteen I read him appeared in a sidebar in the article.
After they were first printed in Parade—to my great surprise—the Thirteen Rules caught on. Over the past twenty-three years, my assistants have given out hundreds of copies of that list in many different forms; they have been PowerPointed and flashed around the world on the Internet.
Here are my rules and the reasons I have hung on to them.
1. It ain’t as bad as you think. It will look better in the morning.
Well, maybe it will, maybe it won’t. This rule reflects an attitude and not a prediction. I have always tried to keep my confidence and optimism up, no matter how difficult the situation. A good night’s rest and the passage of just eight hours will usually reduce the infection. Leaving the office at night with a winning attitude affects more than you alone; it also conveys that attitude to your followers. It strengthens their resolve to believe we can solve any problem.
At the Infantry School, they drilled into us constantly that an infantry officer can do anything. “No challenge is too great for us, no difficulty we cannot overcome.” Think back to Churchill telling the world that Britain will “never, never, never give up.” Or more colloquially, “Don’t let the bastards get you down.”
“Things will get better. You will make them get better.” We graduated believing that, and I continue to believe that, despite frequent evidence to the contrary.
A variation of this theme was also drilled into us: “Lieutenant, you may be starving, but you must never show hunger; you always eat last. You may be freezing or near heat exhaustion, but you must never show that you are cold or hot. You may be terrified, but you must never show fear. You are the leader and the troops will reflect your emotions.” They must believe that no matter how bad things look, you can make them better.
I love old movies and get from them lots of examples that I use for personal reinforcement.
The classic movie The Hustler opens with one of my all-time favorite scenes. It’s set in a New York pool hall. A young pool whiz, Eddie Felson, played by Paul Newman, has come to challenge the reigning master, Minnesota Fats, played by Jackie Gleason. Also present are the pool impresario, Bert Gordon, a Mephistophelean figure played by George C. Scott, and a handful of spectators.
The match begins, and it is clear that Fast Eddie Felson is very good—maybe great. He proceeds to get the edge on Minnesota Fats, game after game, long into the evening. Fats starts to sweat. Others gather around to watch. Fast Eddie and his manager begin to smell triumph. The king is about to die; long live the new king. Fats, ready to give up, looks over to Bert for relief from the misery. Bert simply says, “Stay with this kid, he’s a loser.” Bert is a gambler and detects a weakness in Fast Eddie, an overconfidence that can be taken advantage of. Fats still seems stricken. He excuses himself and goes into the restroom. After washing his hands and face he comes out, seeming ready to leave. He signals to the attendant, and Fast Eddie smiles in victory, thinking Fats is asking for his coat. But no, Fats extends his hands for the attendant to apply talcum powder. Then, with a catlike smile he says, “Fast Eddie, let’s play some pool.” You know the rest—he crushes Eddie.
Many times when facing a tough meeting, an unpleasant encounter, a hostile press conference, or a vicious congressional hearing, the last thing I would do beforehand was go into the restroom, wash and dry my hands and face, look into the mirror, and say softly to myself, “Fast Eddie, let’s play some pool.” I may be down, but never out. An infantry officer can do anything. Oh, full disclosure: Paul Newman is the star. At the end of the movie there is a rematch and he beats Fats. I never watch that scene.




In his promotional article, published in Newsweek magazine, Powell writes:
“The Iraqis were reported to have biological-agent production facilities mounted in
mobile vans. I highlighted the vans in my speech, having been assured that the
information about their existence was multiple-sourced and solid. After the
speech, the mobile-van story fell apart—they didn’t exist. A pair of facts then
emerged that I should have known before I gave the speech. One, our
intelligence people had never actually talked to the single source—nicknamed
Curveball—for the information about the vans, a source our intelligence people
considered flaky and unreliable. Two, based on this and other information no one passed along to me, a number of senior analysts were unsure whether or not the vans existed, and they believed Curveball was unreliable. They had big don’t knows that they never passed on. Some of these same analysts later wrote books claiming they were shocked that I had relied on such deeply flawed evidence.”[1]
Ironically, this is the same Colin Powell who wrote in his
1995 autobiography “My American Journey” of similar lessons learned:
“Don’t be stampeded by first reports, Don’t let your judgments run ahead of your
facts. And, even with supposed facts in hand, question them if they do not add
up. Something deeper and wiser than bits of data inform our instincts.”[2]
“The lesson about experts had been reaffirmed. Don’t be afraid to challenge the
pros, even in their backyard. Just as important, never neglect details, even to
the point of being a pest."[3]
By Powell’s own admission “…facts emerged that I should have known before I gave the speech.” Clearly, Powell failed to apply the lessons learned and written of in “My American Journey”. Powell failed to question facts that did not add up.
Powell failed to recognize that something deeper and wiser inform our
instincts, and now we lionize him and fete him as he seeks to capitalize on his
failure of judgment and failure of leadership.
Should we expect any more of him though? In “My American Journey” he decried the
prosecution of the Vietnam War with:
“I particularly condemn the way our political leaders supplied the manpower for
that war. The policies – determining who would be drafted and who would be deferred, who would serve and who would escape, who would die and who would live—were an antidemocratic disgrace…These young men---poorer, less educated, less privileged—are expendable, but the rest are too good to risk. I am angry that so
many sons of the powerful and well placed …managed to wangle slots into Reserve
and Guard Units"[4]
That was written in 1995, but in 2000 he agreed to serve one of these “sons of the powerful and well placed” who “managed to wangle slots into Reserve and Guard Units” as his Secretary of State. Where is the anger and condemnation Mr. Powell?
He writes again of Vietnam:
“Back home, the administration was trying to conduct the war with as little
inconvenience to the country as possible…. Taxes to finance the war had not
been raised.”[5]
That was 1995 but in 2001, as the Bush Administration undertakes the first of two wars, with as little inconvenience to the country as possible and with tax cuts rather than raising taxes….Powell remained silent.
Powell also wrote:
“I also learned that it is best to get the facts out as soon as possible, even when new facts contradict the old. Untidy truth is better than smooth lies… “[6]
It’s time for the untidy truth Mr. Powell. It’s time for a full accounting of “The
Office of Special Plans” where Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith cherry picked the
intel and molded it to fit Cheney’s agenda in order to justify attacking Iraq. It’s time for you to stop writing books of lessons learned.
If you must write a new book of lessons learned, every cent should be turned over to the support and care of the wounded men and women you put in harm’s way with your failures and deceit.
[1] #comments
[2] Colin Powell, My American Journey, Ballantine Books, 1995, p 274
[3] Ibid, p 106
[4] Ibid, p 144
[5] Ibid, p 128
[6] Ibid, p 274
Not sure what it is you are trying to accomplish here. Couple of points you happen to have overlooked;
I would hold off on judging the General until such a time as he indeed can furnish information (his security clearance is most likely still top secret and if you've held a position in his kind of general schedule, you'd understand.
Your narrative ties together unrelated concepts from ONE SOURCE [perhaps you've read others of his works but considering what is before us here only] and then using your resulting summation as proof they are related.
A point which is clear and critical to bear in mind is that this is a work from a Philosophical vantage point (Philosopher = someone who is trying to find out)
In science, there is the idea;
ABove all, it really is unfortunate your choice of words;
The General shall probably take that regret to the grave with him. He had the strength of character to exit that administration in 2004. He's made it abundantly clear he was misled.
General Powell saved your behind in 1991. This is how you'd honor him? Unfortunately for him, he is a consumate professional. He never could have thrown the administration under the bus even if he didn't agree - hence his leaving in 2004. To now paint him with that brush...
I think you should really credit Schwarzkopf with the success of the first Gulf War, not Powell.
As to whether or not his Powell leaving in 2004 was sufficient protest....ever hear of Elliot Richardson and William Ruckelshaus?
I simply point out that Powell falls into the "do as a say... not as I do" category. He failed as Sec State to challenge a corrupted intelligence community in what he now describes as his own failure to know facts that he should have known, resulting in us entering into an illegal invasion at the cost of thousands of lives lost, tens of thousands of shattered lives and trillions of dollars in costs and so what does he do?
He says, oops my bad, here are the lessons I learned since Volume I of "Colin Powell's Life and Leadership Lessons Learned". He uses his disastrous failure of integrity, wisdom and judgment as the source material for a book from which he seeks to profit financially.
Honor him??? As General Brooks said “Don’t put your soldiers at risk unnecessarily, and share that risk.” Colin Powell failed and now seeks to profit from that failure. Honor him my ass.